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BANKRUPTCY-EXCUSABLE NEGLECT-LATE FILINGS OF BANKRUPTCY
PROOFS OF CLAIMS ARE NOT LIMITED TO THOSE BEYOND THE FILER'S
ABILITY TO CONTROL. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc.
Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
Debtors and creditors must meet many deadlines in bankruptcy
proceedings. One of the most important deadlines is the bar date'
for filing proofs of claims.2 The penalty for failure to meet this
deadline is harsh; the creditor is not recognized as a creditor for
purposes of voting and distribution.3 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) pro-
vides the method by which a court may extend the period of time
within which a party must act in certain circumstances.4 If a deadline
is missed, Rule 9006(b) provides that the bankruptcy court may, at
its discretion, extend the deadline upon a showing of excusable
neglect.'
Assume that an attorney represents a group of clients with a
combined claim against a debtor totaling $7,000,000. The bankruptcy
court establishes a bar date for filing proofs of claims and the
attorney fails to advise the clients that the claims must be filed by
a certain date. The attorney, in the process of leaving his law firm
and without access to the clients' files, discovers after the deadline
that he has missed the bar date. He files the proofs of claims twenty
days after the bar date along with a motion requesting the court
to permit the late filing. The court refuses to allow the late filing.
The result is a group of upset clients and a probable malpractice
action. Such a scenario occurred in a recent case decided by the
United States Supreme Court. 6
1. Bar date is a term used frequently in bankruptcy to describe the date by
which an act must be completed.
2. The bankruptcy court has the authority to establish the bar date for filing
proofs of claims. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3). Any creditor whose claim is not
scheduled by the debtor or is scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated
must file a proof of claim prior to the effective bar date. FED. R. BANKR, P.
3003(c)(2). The claim is scheduled if it is included in the list of creditors filed by
the debtor.
3. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(2). The failure to file a claim does not extinguish
it but makes it unenforceable against the estate of the debtor. 8 LAWRENCE P.
KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 3003.05[3] n.8 (15th ed. 1993).
4. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b).
5. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(2).
6. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct.
1489 (1993).
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II. FACTS AND CASE HISTORY
Pioneer Investment Services Company, hereinafter "Pioneer,"
filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code on April 12, 1989, in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.7 The petition included
a list of the twenty largest unsecured creditors, including all but
one of the respondents.' On April 13, 1989, the bankruptcy court
mailed a notice to Pioneer's creditors which announced a meeting
on May 5, 1989. 9 The notice contained a passage which stated that
a proof of claim had to be filed for all unlisted claims or those
listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated on or before August
3, 1989 -0 ° The placement of the notice of the bar date for filing
proofs of claims in a document entitled "Notice for Meeting of
Creditors" was unusual." The notice of the bar date is normally
placed in a separate document. The notice was received and read
by Mark A. Berlin, president of the corporate general partners of
each of the four respondents. 2 Berlin attended the creditors' meeting
and retained Marc Richards, an experienced bankruptcy attorney,
to represent the four respondents. 3 Berlin provided Richards with
a complete copy of the case file, including the notice of the May
5 creditors' meeting. 14 In an affidavit, Berlin also indicated that
when he asked Richards if there was a deadline for filing proofs
of claims, Richards assured him that the bar date had not been
established. 5 The respondents filed their proofs of claims, which
7. Id. at 1492.
8. Id. The three respondents included in the list of the 20 largest creditors
were Clinton Associates Limited Partnership ("Clinton"), West Knoxville Associates
Limited Partnership ("West Knoxville"), and Brunswick Associates Limited Part-
nership ("Brunswick"). In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 106 B.R. 510, 511-12 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1989). The fourth respondent, Ft. Oglethorpe Associates Limited Part-
nership ("Ft. Oglethorpe") was not included in th !ist. Id.
9. 113 S. Ct. at 1492.
10. Id. The passage stated: "You must file a proof of claim if your claim is
scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated, is unlisted or you do not agree
with the amount. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1111 & Bankruptcy [R]ule 3003. Bar date
is August 3, 1989." Id.
11. Id. at 1499. "Ordinarily the bar date in a bankruptcy case should be
prominently announced and accompanied by an explanation of its significance."
Id. at 1499-1500 (citing In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 943 F.2d 673, 678 (6th Cir.
1991)).
12. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1492. Berlin is the president of Robriste Enterprises,
Inc., general partner of Clinton, West Knoxville, and Brunswick. Pioneer, 106 B.R.
at 512. He is also the president of Pudding Enterprises, Inc., general partner of
Ft. Oglethorpe. Id.





totaled $6,943,139,16 on August 23, 1989, twenty days after the bar
date of August 3, 1989, along with a motion asking the court to
permit the late filing. 7 In his motion, Richards claimed that he was
unaware of the bar date and that, at the time, he was withdrawing
from his former law firm and did not have access to his files during
the first half of August, 1989.18
Pioneer's schedules listed three of the respondents as general
unsecured creditors and listed the claims as contingent, unliquidated,
and disputed.19 Accordingly, the respondents were required by Section
1111(a) to file proofs of claims with the bankruptcy court. 20 Rule
3003 requires that the bankruptcy court establish a bar date for
filing the proofs of claims. 21 The failure to file a required proof of
claim by the bar date has drastic results. Under Rule 3003, a creditor
who fails to file a proof of claim when required is not treated as
a creditor for purposes of voting and distribution. 22 The bar date
may be extended by the court for "cause shown" under Rule
3003(c). 23 The bankruptcy court concluded that Rule 3003(c)(3) must
be read in conjunction with Rule 9006(b). 24 Rule 9006(b)(1) permits
16. Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 513. Claims were filed in the following amounts:
Clinton-$S1,567,650; Brunswick-$2,364,336; West Knoxville-$2,280,831; and Ft.
Oglethorpe-$730,322. Id.
17. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1492.
18. Id. at 1492-93.
19. Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 513. The respondents were not included in debtor's
statement of financial affairs as originally filed on May 18, 1989. Id. at 512.
However, the schedules were amended on May 25, 1989, to "include Clinton, West
Knoxville, and Brunswick as creditors holding contingent, unliquidated, and disputed
claims." Id. at 512-13. Ft. Oglethorpe was not listed as a creditor. See supra note
8.
20. Section 1111(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[a] proof of claim
or interest is deemed filed under section 501 of this title for any claim or interest
that appears in the schedules filed under section 521(1) or 1106(a)(2) of this title,
except a claim or interest that is scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated."
11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1988). Section 521() refers to the list of creditors filed by
the debtor. I U.S.C. § 521() (1988). Section 1106(a)(2) refers to the list of creditors
filed by the trustee if the debtor did not file a list. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(2) (1988).
21. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3).
22. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(2) states that "any creditor who fails to [file
a proof of claim within the prescribed time] shall not be treated as a creditor with
respect to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution." See supra note
3.
23. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3) provides that "[tlhe court shall fix and for
cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may
be filed."
24. Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 514 (quoting In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60
(3d Cir. 1988); In re South Atl. Fin. Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 817 (11th Cir. 1985);
In re Dix, 95 B.R. 134, 137 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988)). A few courts have concluded
that the "for cause" language in Rule 3003(c)(3) creates a different standard than
"excusable neglect". 8 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
3003.05[41[a] (15th ed. 1993) (citations omitted).
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the court in certain circumstances to extend the time period upon
a motion filed after the expiration of the specified period where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. 25
The bankruptcy court denied the motion to allow the late filing. 26
Following precedent established by the Eleventh Circuit, the court
held that a party cannot claim excusable neglect unless the late filing
is due to circumstances beyond its ability to control. 27 On appeal,
the district court remanded, adopting a more liberal reading of the
meaning of excusable neglect. 2 After weighing the equitable factors
applied by the district court, the bankruptcy court, in an unpublished
opinion, again denied the respondents' motion.2 9 The bankruptcy
court attached considerable importance to its findings that the delay
was not outside the control of the respondents and that it was not
improper to penalize the respondents for the neglect of their counsel.3 0
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court holding but was
25. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1) provides:
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, when
an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period
by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without
motion or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made
before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was
the result of excusable neglect.
26. Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 517. Following the bankruptcy court decision, the
respondents sued Richards for malpractice. Excusable Neglect, THE NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 5, 1993, at 11. That case was pending in New York at the time of the
Supreme Court Pioneer decision. Id.
27. 106 B.R. at 516 (quoting In re South At. Fin. Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 817
(l1th Cir. 1985)).
28. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1493. The district court instructed the bankruptcy
court to consider the following factors:
(1) whether granting the delay will pr;udice the debtor; (2) the length of
the delay and its impact on efficient court administration; (3) whether the
delay was beyond the reasonable control of the person whose duty it was
to perform; (4) whether the creditor acted in good faith; and (5) whether
clients should be penalized for their counsel's mistake or neglect.
Id. (quoting In re Dix, 95 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988) (in turn quoting
In re Magourik, 693 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1982)).
29. 113 S. Ct. at 1493.
30. Id. The bankruptcy court found the following on each factor:
(1) that petitioner would not be prejudiced by the late filings; (2) that
the 20-day delay in filing the proofs of claim would have no adverse
impact on efficient court administration; (3) that the reason for the delay
was not outside respondents' control; (4) that respondents and their counsel
acted in good faith; and (5) that, in light of Berlin's business sophistication
and his actual knowledge of the bar date, it would not be improper to
penalize respondents for the neglect of their counsel.
BANKRUPTCY
reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.a' The court
of appeals confirmed the district court's conclusion that existing
precedent followed a more liberal approach to defining excusable
neglect.32 However, the court of appeals disagreed with the bank-
ruptcy court's conclusion on remand that the respondents should be
penalized for the errors of their counsel.33
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Rule 9006 provides for enlargement of the time allowed for
certain acts in bankruptcy proceedings.3 4 The rule was patterned after
Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 26(b)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.35 Rule 9006 applies to
all deadlines except those specifically excluded or limited.3 6 Enlarge-
ment under certain rules is permitted only as provided in the rule
itself.37 Because Rule 3003 is not an exception specifically identified
31. Id.
32. Pioneer, 943 F.2d at 676-77.
33. Id. The court of appeals also found the peculiar and inconspicuous placement
of the bar date in the notice of the creditors' meeting significant. Id. at 678.
34. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006. See supra note 25 for the text of Rule 9006.
35. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b), Advisory Committee Notes. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 6 provides:
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within
a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion
(1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request
therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed
or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect ... "
FED. R. Crv. P. 6(b).
36. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(2)-(3). Under subsection (b)(2), the court does
not have the power to enlarge the time period for the time specified by certain
rules, including the following: (1) the time for filing a list of the 20 largest creditors
under Rule 1007(d); (2) the time for sending notice of dismissal for failure to pay
the filing fee as provided in Rule 1017(b)(3); (3) the 20 to 40 day period for the
meeting of the creditors as provided by Rule 2003(a); (4) the 10 day period for
filing a motion to resolve an election dispute provided by Rule 2003(d); (5) the
10 day period allowed by Rule 7052 to move to amend findings of fact; (6) the
time to move for a new trial under Rule 9023; and (7) the time provided by Rule
9024 to move for relief from a judgment. 9 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, 9006.05[2] (15th ed. 1993).
37. Under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3) enlargement is permitted only to the
extent and under the conditions stated in the following rules: (1) Rule 1006(b)(2),
the time for paying the filing fee in installments cannot be more than 180 days
after the petition is filed, even after enlargement; (2) Rule 1017(e), the time period
for filing motions to dismiss a debtor's Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse; (3)
Rule 3002(c), the time for filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 7 or 13 case; (4)
Rule 4003(b), the time period for filing objections to a claim of exemption; (5)
1994]
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in Rule 9006, most courts have held that the deadline for late filings
of claims may be extended after the bar date upon a showing of
excusable neglect. a"
Prior to the Pioneer decision, the courts of appeals were split
over the proper interpretation of excusable neglect.3 9 The Eleventh
Circuit adopted a strict construction of excusable neglect when it
determined that failure to file a proof of claim must result from
circumstances beyond the party's reasonable control. 4° The creditor
in the Eleventh Circuit decision of In re South Ati. Fin. Corp. failed
to file a timely claim because its counsel mistakenly believed her
predecessor had filed the proof of claim. 4' The court concluded that
the focus of the inquiry under Rule 9006 should be on the movant's
actions, not on the prejudicial effect or lack thereof on the other
parties.4 2 As the creditor's counsel could have easily ascertained
whether the proof of claim had been filed, the late filing was within
the company's reasonable control and did not constitute excusable
neglect .43
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits followed the lead of the Elev-
enth Circuit in adopting a strict interpretation of excusable neglect
under Rule 9006." However, these decisions did not involve late
filings of proofs of claims in a Chapter 11 proceeding but involved
Chapter 7 proceedings.
45
Rule 4004(a), the time period in which to object to a discharge; (6) Rule 4007(c),
the time period within which to file a dischargeability complaint; (7) Rule 8002,
the time period for filing a notice of appeal; and (8) Rule 9033, the time period
for filing objections to a bankruptcy judge's proposed finding of fact and conclusions
of law. 9 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 9006.05[3] (15th
ed. 1993).
38. 8 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 3003.05 (15th
ed. 1993) (citations omitted). While the Supreme Court did not address this issue
in Pioneer, the Court did adopt an excusable neglect standard in a Rule 3003
question, thus implicitly settling this issue. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
39. 9 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 9006.06 (15th
ed. 1993).
40. In re South Atl. Fin. Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 817 (lth Cir. 1985) (quoting
In re Gem Rail Corp., 12 B.R. 929, 931 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)). In its initial
decision, the Pioneer bankruptcy court adopted' this philosophy. See supra note
27.
41. South Atlantic, 767 F.2d at 816.
42. Id. at 818-19.
43. Id.
44. In re Davis, 936 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Danielson, 981 F.2d
296, 297 (7th Cir. 1992).
45. Davis, 936 F.2d at 772; Danielson, 981 F.2d at 297.
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The Eighth Circuit also indicated it followed a strict construction
of excusable neglect in Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota,
N.A .46 The Hanson court did not find excusable neglect when a
creditor filed a late ballot accepting the debtor's plan because it
had experienced employee turnover.4 1 In so holding, the Eighth
Circuit appeared to have adopted the strict standard adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit in In re South. At. Fin. Corp.48 However, the
Eighth Circuit decision is not clear on whether the only consideration
is the determination of whether the event is beyond the creditor's
reasonable control.4 9 The court concluded only that prejudice in and
of itself is not sufficient to warrant an extension. 0
In In re Magouirk, the Ninth Circuit took a more liberal view
of excusable neglect and isolated five equitable factors which had
been considered by other courts in an evaluation of whether excusable
neglect exists." The creditor in Magouirk failed to file a timely
complaint to determine discharge ability of a debt.12 The Magouirk
court concluded that a liberal definition of excusable neglect should
be applied and then noted a broad range of factors considered by
other bankruptcy courts." The Magouirk Court listed these factors
as:
(1) whether granting the delay will prejudice the debtor, (2) the
length of the delay and its impact on efficient court administration,
(3) whether the delay was beyond the reasonable control of the
person whose duty it was to perform, (4) whether the creditor
acted in good faith, and (5) whether clients should be penalized
for their counsel's mistake or neglect.5 4
Although the Magourik holding applied only to an untimely objection
to the discharge of an individual debt,55 the Ninth Circuit, in In re
46. 828 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 1315 (noting that employee turnover is considered to be within the
employer's reasonable control).
48. See supra note 27 and the accompanying text.
49. Hanson, 828 F.2d at 1315.
50. Id. The court stated: "While the prejudicial effect on other interests may
be a factor in the exercise of the court's discretion under the rule, the excusable
neglect must result at least in part from the act of the party failing to perform."
Id. This leaves open the possibility that the court may consider equitable factors
when appropriate.
51. 693 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 949.
53. Id. at 951.
54. Id. (citing In re Heyward, 15 B.R. 629 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re
Hinote, 13 B.R. 874 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Klayer, 13 B.R. 542 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1981); In re Wallace, 12 B.R. 938 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Gerber,
7 B.R. 910 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981)).
55. Magourik, 693 F.2d at 951.
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Dix, adopted both the liberal construction for the late filing of
proofs of claims and the five equitable factors noted in Magouirk.5 6
After applying these five factors, the Dix court allowed the late
filing of a claim in a case where the creditor was not aware of his
claim before the bar date passed.57
The five equitable factors noted in Magouirk and applied in
Dix were adopted by the Tenth Circuit in In re Centric Corp. 8
After determining that the first three factors weighed against the
creditor, the Tenth Circuit refused to allow the creditor's untimely
opposition to a debtor's objection to its proof of claim without
considering the fourth and fifth factor.59
In its decision in Pioneer, the Sixth Circuit adopted a liberal
interpretation of excusable neglect and affirmed with qualification
the district court's adoption of these five equitable factors.6
IV. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pioneer
because of the conflict among the circuits over the meaning of
"excusable neglect". 6' In a close decision, 62 Justice White delivered
the opinion of the court affirming a more liberal view of excusable
neglect .63
The Pioneer majority's analysis of the meaning of excusable
neglect began with the dictionary meaning of neglect which includes
faultless omissions as well as those resulting from carelessness. 64 The
plain meaning of excusable neglect, therefore, encompasses late filings
which result from inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness and late
56. 95 B.R. 134 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 139.
58. 901 F.2d 1514, 1517 (10th Cir. 1990).
59. Id. at 1517-18 (but noting an additional consideration that, if the opposition
was allowed, the creditor would have collected little, if anything).
60. Pioneer, 943 F.2d at 677 (qualifying these factors as aids for case-by-case
adjudication, rather than a necessary or complete list of the factors to be considered).
61. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1494.
62. The decision was 5-4 with Justices J. White, C. J. Rehnquist, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Kennedy in the majority. Id. at 1491. Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Souter, and Thomas dissented. Id.
63. Id. at 1491. The Court did not address the "for cause" exception in Rule
3003. See supra note 23. Instead, by adopting an excusable neglect standard in a
Rule 3003 question, the Court implicitly concluded that Rule 3003 must be read
in conjunction with Rule 9006. See supra note 38.
64. 113 S. Ct. at 1494-95. The Court noted that Webster's defines neglect as
'to give little attention or respect' to or 'to leave undone or unattended to




filings caused by circumstances beyond the party's ability to control. 65
The Pioneer majority also looked to the policies underlying the
purpose of Chapter 11 to support the balancing approach it ultimately
adopted. 66 Chapter 11 entrusts bankruptcy courts with broad equitable
powers to balance the interests of the parties in order to ensure the
success of the reorganization. 67 The Court concluded this equitable
inquiry should be extended to the interpretation of excusable neglect.
61
The Pioneer majority also concluded that the history of the
bankruptcy rules supported its conclusion that enlargement is not
limited to those circumstances where the failure to file was beyond
the filing party's ability to control. 69 The Advisory Committee notes
to former Rule 10-401(b), forerunner to Rule 3003(c), noted that
the bankruptcy rules insure that those who fail to file their claims
through inadvertence or otherwise are allowed to participate.
70
The Court concluded that the determination of excusable neglect
is an equitable one which should take into account all relevant
circumstances, including possible prejudice to the debtor, "length
of the delay and its impact on judicial proceedings, reason for the
delay," and the good faith of the creditor. 7' The Court refused,
however, to adopt the fifth factor considered by the Sixth Circuit:
whether it is appropriate under the circumstances to penalize the
client for the negligence of its attorney. 72 To the contrary, the Court
affirmed its position that clients are accountable for the acts of
their attorneys as stated in Smith v. Ayer.73
65. 113 S. Ct. at 1495.
66. Id. While Rule 9006 applies to late filings of proofs of claims in Chapter
11 filings, it does not apply to the equivalent rule in Chapter 7 filings, Rule 3002(c).
Id. See supra note 37.
67. 113 S. Ct. at 1495.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1496.
70. Id. "'This attitude is carried forward in the rules, first by dispensing with
the need to file proofs of claims and stock interests in most instances and, secondly,
by permitting enlargement of the fixed bar date in a particular case with leave of
court and for cause shown in accordance with the equities of the situation."' Id.
(quoting Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 10-401(b), reprinted in
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 10-401.01 (14th ed. 1977)).
71. 113 S. Ct. at 1498. The factors outlined by the Court include those first
mentioned in the context of late claims filings under Rule 3003 in In re Dix. 95
B.R. at 138. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
72. 113 S. Ct. at 1499. The attorney's neglect was a key consideration in the
finding of excusable neglect by the Sixth Circuit: "While we find that the bankruptcy
court did apply the Dix factors as directed by the district court on remand, it
inappropriately penalized the plaintiffs for the errors of their counsel." Pioneer,
943 F.2d at 677.
73. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1499.
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action,
1994]
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After concluding that the decision of whether there was excusable
neglect should be an equitable one, taking into account all relevant
factors, including those applied in Dix, the Court turned to the
facts in Pioneer.74 The Pioneer majority agreed with the Sixth Circuit
that the lack of prejudice to the debtor, lack of impact on the
efficiency of the administration of the court, and the good faith of
the creditors and their counsel weighed heavily in favor of granting
permission for the late filing. 75 The Court gave little weight to the
upheaval in the attorney's practice.76 Instead, the Court considered
the inadequacy of the notice of the bar date of great significance. 77
Ordinarily, the notice of the bar date is in a separate document
rather than included in a notice of a creditor's meeting, as was the
case with the Pioneer notice. 78 In fact, the Court concluded that
the form of notice required a finding of excusable neglect. 79
The dissent in Pioneer concluded that the balancing approach
is inconsistent with the plain meaning of neglect and it unduly
complicates the task of the courts applying the rule.80 The dissent
concluded that Rule 9006 requires a two-part test.8 First, the court
must conclude that the failure to file resulted from excusable neglect.82
and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of
this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent
with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed
bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have "notice
of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney."
Id. (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1980)).
74. 113 S. Ct. at 1499.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. See supra note 10 for the text of the notice.
78. 113 S. Ct. at 1499.
79. Id. at 1499-1500. "We agree with the [Court of Appeals] that the 'peculiar
and inconspicuous placement of the bar date in a notice regarding a creditors[']
meeting,' without any indication of the significance of the bar date, left a 'dramatic
ambiguity' in the notification." Id. at 1500 (quoting Pioneer, 943 F.2d at 678).
This is not to say, of course, that respondents' counsel was not remiss
in failing to apprehend the notice. To be sure, were there any evidence
of prejudice to petitioner or to judicial administration in this case, or any
indication at all of bad faith, we could not say that the Bankruptcy Court
abused its discretion in declining to find the neglect to be "excusable."
In the absence of such a showing, however, we conclude that the unusual
form of notice employed in this case requires a finding that the neglect
of respondents' counsel was, under all the circumstances, "excusable."
Id.
80. 113 S. Ct. at 1500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined
by Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas. Id.
81. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Second, if excusable neglect is established, the court must consider
the equities and grant relief in its discretion."3 The focus of the first
inquiry should be on the movant's actions and the reasons for those
actions, not on the effect of the extension . 4 The dissent argued that
the majority, in eliminating the "bright-line" rule, introduced un-
certainty into a routine matter and encouraged litigants to appeal.85
Perhaps the most persuasive argument of the dissent is that the
record did not support the majority's conclusion that respondents
or their counsel did not have actual notice.8 6 The dissent suggested
that in such circumstances, the case should be remanded to the
bankruptcy court for a factual finding.87
The Pioneer majority directed bankruptcy courts to balance the
equities rather than adopt a "bright-line" rule in their interpretations
of excusable neglect. 88 Bankruptcy courts can no longer base their
analyses of excusable neglect solely on the question of the fault of
the filing party.8 9 Instead, the courts must consider all relevant
circumstances, including the impact of the late filing on other parties.90
V. SIGNIFICANCE
There is no question that the Supreme Court eliminated the
"bright-line" rule. However, the question of how often the equities
will weigh in favor of a late filing of proofs of claims remains.
In Pioneer, one of the factors which weighed in favor of the
creditors was the lack of prejudice to other parties if the late filing
were allowed. 9' Although the Supreme Court did not mention it,
Pioneer's plan called for payment of 100 cents on the dollar to
unsecured creditors. 92 It is hard to imagine a situation which results
in less prejudice to other creditors.
83. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1501-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In applying a balancing test to the
facts in Pioneer, two courts concluded that the respondents' neglect was inexcusable.
Conversely, two courts, the court of appeals and the United States Supreme Court,
concluded it was excusable. Id.
86. Id. at 1503-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed that if the
inadequate notice of the bar date caused the respondents to miss the deadline, the
failure may be excusable neglect. Id.
87. Id. at 1504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1498-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
92. Brief for Respondents, Sept. 1, 1992, Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1389 (1993) (No. 91-1695); available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Briefs File.
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The Pioneer decision extends beyond the finding of excusable
neglect when the bar date for proofs of claim is not adequately
displayed. Rule 9006(b) permits a party to move for an extension
in all circumstances except those specifically excepted. 93 The excusable
neglect standard established in Pioneer has been applied to situations
in which there was a failure to file a timely brief 94 and a failure
to file a timely answer to a complaint. 95
Soon after its decision in Pioneer, the Supreme Court remanded
In re Harlow Fay, Inc.96 to the Eighth Circuit to reconsider its
decision in light of the holding in Pioneer.97 In its original decision,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court decision denying a finding
of excusable neglect in the failure to file a timely brief. 98 After
receiving several extensions of time to file a brief, Harlow requested
an additional extension after the filing date. 99 Upon considering the
decision on remand, the Eighth Circuit again found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Harlow's appeal on
the basis that the debtor did not establish excusable neglect.'0°
On April 23, 1993, a bankruptcy court in northern Idaho granted
a motion to extend the time for filing a proof of claim where the
creditor's attorney advised it not to file a proof of claim because
the attorney thought the debtor would be able to claim an offset.'0
Although there was a lengthy delay between the motion and the
bar date, and the delay was solely the result of the attorney's decision,
the court concluded the deadline should be extended as there was
no showing of prejudice to the debtor or that granting the motion
would delay administration of the case. 10 2 The court also noted that
the debtor's disclosure statement filed after the bar date continued
to list the creditor as the holder of a disputed claim. 03
A New York bankruptcy court interpreted the Pioneer decision
narrowly and concluded that the Pioneer holding stood for a finding
U excusable- .g.lt when ti L a dt1 ... c is i:^- ltdU tU;.'-"
93. See supra notes 36-37.
94. In re Harlow Fay, Inc., 993 F.2d 1351 (8th Cir. 1993).
95. In re Maps Int'l, Inc., 152 B.R. 989, 990 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993).
96. 951 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1991).
97. Harlow Fay, Inc. v. Federal Land Bank, 113 S. Ct. 1809 (1993).
98. Harlow, 951 F.2d at 176.
99. Id.
100. In re Harlow Fay, Inc., 993 F.2d 1351 (8th Cir. 1993).
101. In re Earth Rock, 153 B.R. 61 (Bankr. N.D. Idaho 1993).
102. Id. at 63. The delay was eight months, indicating a "severe lack of diligence
on the part of both Creditor and its counsel .... " Id.
103. Id.





The full impact of Pioneer has not been determined. Certainly,
bankruptcy courts will have to consider each of the equitable factors
established by the Pioneer court in each evaluation of a motion for
an enlargement of time under Rule 9006. The courts can no longer
base their decision solely on whether the late filing was due to
circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the filer. The con-
venience of a "bright-line" rule has been eliminated. However, it
is evident from the post-Pioneer decisions that the Pioneer holding
is subject to varied interpretation.
Sue Patton Mosley

